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THE NIRECO POISON PILL:  
THE IMPACT OF A COURT INJUNCTION 
From New Business Law Journal No. 812 (2005.7.1) 
By Toshihiko Shimizu and Toshihiro Igi 
Translated by Christopher J. Kodama† 
Translator’s Note: The emergence of a market for corporate control in Japan is a 
phenomenon that many commentators on Japan’s business and legal environs had been 
anticipating since the turn of the new millennium.  A gradual decline in corporate cross-
shareholding and stable shareholding by financial institutions along with a concomitant 
increase in foreign and individual shareholders, a significant number of inefficient firms 
still being affected by Japan’s prolonged recession until recent years and trading at prices 
below their market value, and Commercial Code revisions making the legal environment 
more conducive to merger and acquisition activity and providing for more flexible 
restructuring mechanisms, all pointed to a potential hostile takeover trend akin to that 
which occurred in the United States during the 1980s.  However, it was not until early 
2005, when Takafumi Horie, CEO of the internet firm Livedoor, made an unsolicited bid 
for majority control over Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc., that the hostile-takeover era 
seemed to have officially arrived upon Japan’s doorstep.  The ensuing media frenzy 
surrounding the rare hostile takeover attempt and the eventual decision by the Tokyo 
District Court to block Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc.’s issuance of stock purchase 
warrants to a friendly shareholder to thwart the takeover attempt compelled Japan’s 
government and business sectors into action.  The result was a wide embrace of an anti-
takeover mechanism commonly known as the “poison pill.” 
A Japanese manufacturer of hi-tech measuring devices was the first to officially act, 
when on March 14, 2005, just days after the Tokyo District Court’s first ruling in the 
Nippon Broadcasting case and a couple of months before the Japanese government would 
respond with its recommendations on the adoption of anti-takeover mechanisms, the 
board of directors of Nireco Co. voted to adopt a poison pill as a preliminary anti-
takeover device.  The Nireco poison pill authorized the issuance of stock purchase 
warrants to the company’s current shareholders.  These warrants could be exercised to 
dilute a hostile bidder’s shareholding in circumstances where the board of directors 
deems the acquisition not to be in the long-term interests of the company.  However, the 
Nireco poison pill did not go unchallenged.  On May 9, 2005, an investment fund owning 
6.8% of Nireco’s outstanding shares filed a petition for a provisional injunction against 
the poison pill, arguing that the issuance of stock purchase warrants in the absence of a 
hostile bidder was grossly unfair because it would cause unforeseen financial harm to 
existing shareholders as well as to future shareholders. 
This Article focuses upon the attempt by Nireco’s board of directors to implement 
what would have been Japan’s first poison pill and the subsequent decision by the Tokyo 
courts to enjoin the preliminary anti-takeover device as grossly unfair.  The authors 
examine the substantive and procedural characteristics of the poison pill, including the 
deficiencies prompting the Tokyo District Court to block Nireco its implementation, as 
                                           
†
 The translator graduated from the University of Washington School of Law in 2006 and is 
currently an associate with Davis Polk & Wardwell.  He would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor for 
encouraging him to publish this translation and his family and friends for their support and patience.  Any 
comments regarding this article can be directed to christopher.kodama@dpw.com. 
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well as the potential impact of the court’s decision on future business practice in Japan.  
By placing the court’s decision in the Nireco case within the history of jurisprudence 
relating to corporate issuances of new shares or stock purchase warrants challenged as 
grossly unfair under Japan’s Commercial Code, now the Company law, the authors seek 
to emphasize (1) the court’s shift away from the main purpose rule standard of judgment 
in favor of a reasonable means standard for evaluating anti-takeover mechanisms, 
whether adopted in the face of a hostile acquirer or simply as a preliminary anti-takeover 
device; (2) the court’s addition of pure economic harm to the list of potential harms to 
shareholders; and (3) lingering questions regarding the role of the general shareholder 
meeting in approving an anti-takeover mechanism.  While the authors eschew any strong 
stance on the appropriateness of the poison pill within Japan’s corporate governance 
structure, they do predict that the judiciary will play a prominent role in the future 
development of anti-takeover mechanisms like the poison pill, in part due to the 
developments in the Nireco case. 
 
Summary:  The much heralded arrival of the corporate hostile-
takeover era in Japan has prompted a variety of responses from Japan’s 
legislature, bureaucracy, and business sector.  Among these responses was 
what could have been Japan’s first poison pill, an issuance of stock purchase 
warrants approved by Nireco Co.’s Board of Directors as part of a 
shareholder rights plan.  However, concerns over potential harm to Nireco 
shareholders due to structural flaws in the poison pill prompted a court battle 
and ultimately led to a judicial order preventing the issuance.  This paper 
seeks to uncover the substantive aspects of the Nireco case by examining the 
various legal issues it raised and its potential impact on the future of 
corporate defensive measures in Japan. 
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1. THE NIRECO POISON PILL 
(1) On March 14, 2005, in the midst of a highly publicized battle 
between Livedoor, Inc. and Fuji Television Network, Inc. over managerial 
control of Nippon Broadcasting Systems, and directly after a decision by the 
Tokyo District Court enjoining Nippon Broadcasting’s Board of Directors 
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from issuing stock purchase warrants to dilute Livedoor’s ownership,1 
Nireco Co. (“Nireco”) publicly announced its own decision to issue stock 
purchase warrants under a shareholder rights plan.2  This so-called “poison 
pill,” if realized, would become the first of its kind in Japan. 
(2) The following is a general outline of the poison pill adopted by the 
Nireco Board of Directors: 
1. Nireco will allocate two gratuitous stock purchase warrants for each 
Nireco share held by shareholders of record as of March 31, 2004.3 
2. The stock purchase warrants are non-transferable and non-
assignable. 
3. Upon a determination by the Nireco Board of Directors that a 
hostile bidder had sought to acquire twenty percent or more of the 
corporation’s outstanding shares, shareholders who have received 
the stock purchase warrants can exercise them to acquire Nireco 
shares at a cost of 1 yen per share.   
4. The Nireco Board of Directors has the authority to redeem or refuse 
to redeem the stock purchase warrants.  In making this decision, the 
Board of Directors will respect the recommendation of a special 
committee comprised of three outside experts; however, situations 
in which the committee’s recommendation is not followed also are 
possible. 
5. The Board of Director’s refusal to redeem the stock purchase 
warrants is limited to the following circumstances:  
i. The acquirer is a greenmailer; 
ii. The acquirer is planning a scorched earth policy; 
iii. The acquirer is planning a leveraged buyout;4 
iv. The acquirer is a corporate raider planning to resell the 
corporation to the highest bidder;5 
                                           
1
 The three Livedoor v. Nippon Broadcasting decisions, Livedoor K.K v. Nippon Broad. K.K., 252 
Shōji Hōmu Shiryōban 275 (Tōkyō D.Ct., March 11, 2005); Livedoor K.K. v. Nippon Broad. K.K.,  252 
Shōji Hōmu Shiryōban 294 (Tōkyō D.Ct., March 16, 2005); and Nippon Broad. K.K. v. Livedoor K.K., 252 
Shōji Hōmu Shiryōban 300 (Tōkyō High Ct., March 23, 2005) are referred herein collectively as the 
“Nippon Broadcasting decision,” while the case itself generally will be referred to as the “Nippon 
Broadcasting case.” 
2
 Nireco’s announcement came between the first and second Nippon Broadcasting decisions.  
3
 In this article, the terms “share” or “stock” refer to voting shares and “shareholder” or 
“stockholder” refer to the owner of a voting share or shares. 
4
 Translator’s note:  in his more recent articles on similar topics, the author Toshihiko Shimizu has 
pointed out the Nippon Broadcasting decision, from which this language likely was borrowed, did not 
specifically address leveraged buyouts, but rather situations in which the acquirer would abuse the target 
corporation’s assets for the acquirer’s own matters. 
5
 It is likely that Nireco incorporated these conditions borrowing directly from the Tokyo High 
Court’s decision in the Nippon Broadcasting Case.  [Translator’s Note:  There is a strong similarity 
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v. Other situations, such as where there is an obvious threat of 
harm to the corporate value of the Nireco group, including 
but not limited to existing Nireco shareholders, business 
affiliates, customers, employees, regional companies, or 
other stakeholders. 
(3) Since a stock purchase warrant generally is not transferred along 
with the share to which it was allocated and individual assignment of the 
warrant is prohibited under the terms of Nireco’s poison pill, potential 
acquirers have no way to obtain any stock purchase warrants after they have 
been allocated; they are limited to an acquisition of shares already 
outstanding at that moment.  Thus, even if a prospective acquirer obtains 
twenty percent or more of the corporation’s outstanding shares, his or her 
share ownership could be diluted to one-third if and when the stock purchase 
warrants are exercised to acquire new shares.  Accordingly, any potential 
acquirer would have no choice but to request the target management to 
redeem the stock purchase warrants before reaching twenty percent 
ownership of the outstanding shares and hope that the target management 
responds favorably by agreeing to partake in acquisition negotiations.  In 
this way, even if a corporate bidder does present itself, the target 
management can avoid hasty decision making and take reasonable time to 
negotiate with the bidder, thereby making the poison pill an effective 
defensive mechanism.  This type of poison pill has also been regarded as a 
comparatively simple, low cost, and convenient defense scheme,6 
particularly suitable for small to medium-sized corporations seeking to avoid 
the burdens of corporate defense as much as possible.7 
(4) Under the terms of the Nireco poison pill, the issuance of stock 
purchase warrants was scheduled for June 16, 2005. 
2. THE INVESTMENT FUND’S PETITION FOR AN INJUNCTION 
(1) On May 9, 2005, an investment fund owning a little less than three 
percent of Nireco’s outstanding shares submitted a petition for a temporary 
                                                                                                                              
between the language used in the final appellate decision in the Nippon Broadcasting case and the Nireco 
poison pill.  For an English translation of the relevant portion of the Nippon Broadcasting decision, see 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2171, 2193-94 (November 2005).] 
6
 Whereas the Nireco poison pill allotted stock purchase warrants to current shareholders, other 
types of poison pills have utilized different mechanisms, such as the “trust model,” the issuance registration 
system, and the third-party issuance. 
7
 Ōta Yō, Japanese-Style Rights Plan—A Focus on the Nireco Security Plan, MARR, June 2005, at 
14. 
JUNE 2007 THE NIRECO POISON PILL 617 
  
injunction against Nireco’s issuance of the stock purchase warrants.8  The 
main argument raised by the investment fund is that the issuance of stock 
purchase warrants is grossly unfair.  If the issuance were allowed, potential 
investors in Nireco would be submitting themselves to a considerable and 
incalculable risk that their shareholding will be substantially diluted, thereby 
forcing them to take an extremely cautious approach when considering any 
purchase of Nireco shares.  This cautious approach leads to a decline in 
Nireco’s business reputation, which in turn causes unanticipated harm to 
existing shareholders because of a potential negative effect on the economic 
value of their current shareholding.  Accordingly, the investment fund 
argued, the issuance of stock purchase warrants under the shareholder rights 
plan is grossly unfair and should be enjoined by the court.   
(2) In comparison to the Nippon Broadcasting case, the Nireco case 
may not have attracted as much media attention in Japan or elsewhere, but in 
terms of providing guidance to corporations and to relevant experts 
regarding the appropriateness of adopting anti-takeover mechanisms, the 
Nireco case is much more important.   
It is also important to keep in mind that the courts are not the only 
actors who have felt compelled to respond to the apparent arrival of the 
hostile takeover era in Japan.  Immediately following the Nippon 
Broadcasting case, a number of other corporations besides Nireco 
announced their own plans to adopt corporate defense measures.  These 
defensive measures took a variety of forms, with some even being discussed 
at the general shareholder meetings held that June.  In May 2005, the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (“METI”), and the Ministry of 
Justice published their Guidelines on Hostile Takeover Defense and 
Corporate Value Protection Measures and METI’s Corporate Value Study 
Group published its final report.  Around the same time, the National Diet 
was discussing a bill relating to corporate takeover defense mechanisms.  
Thus, as businesses like Nireco experimented with methods to defend 
against the perceived threat of corporate takeovers in the real world, Japan’s 
legislature, administration, and judiciary all grappled with the problem from 
a policy perspective—without any guidance from Japan’s domestic legal 
history. 
                                           
8
 Translator’s Note:  According to the actual court decision, the petitioner SVP Value Realization 
Master Fund Limited owned 2.85% of Nireco’s outstanding shares; however, news reports indicated that 
the petitioner’s share ownership was 6.85%.  In any case, the actual amount of the petitioner’s shareholding 
is not important in the court’s decision. 
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3. THE TOKYO DISTRICT COURT DECISION 
(1) On June 1, 2005, the Tokyo District Court found that Nireco’s 
stock purchase warrants were grossly unfair and granted a temporary 
injunction against their issuance.9  Nireco filed an objection, but the District 
Court’s decision was affirmed on June 9, 2005.10  Although this case may 
seem to be just another battle over anti-takeover measures following on the 
heels of the Nippon Broadcasting case, in actuality, its potential impact on 
business practices is much greater than the Nippon Broadcasting case 
because it addresses peacetime poison pills—that is, anti-takeover measures 
enacted in the absence of a hostile bidder.   
(2) The Tokyo District Court offered the following reasons for finding 
that Nireco’s issuance of stock purchase warrants authorized under the terms 
of the poison pill was grossly unfair: 
1. The poison pill was not “structured to reflect the views of the 
shareholders regarding the issuance of stock purchase warrants as a 
preliminary countermeasure.” 
2. The poison pill was not “structured to prevent arbitrary decisions by 
the board of directors in connection with redemption of the stock 
purchase warrants.” 
3. It could not be said that “the issuance of the stock purchase warrants 
did not potentially harm shareholders unconnected to the acquirer.” 
As a result, the court could not find that “the issuance of stock 
purchase warrants, as a preliminary countermeasure, was accomplished 
through reasonable means.” 
Upon a closer examination of the court’s decision, with respect to 
reason 1, the court pointed out that the Nireco Board of Directors did not 
intend to obtain approval for the poison pill at the general shareholder 
meeting scheduled for June 2005, nor did it establish a method through 
which the redemption of the stock purchase warrants could be made by a 
decision at the general shareholder meeting. 
With respect to reason 2, according to the Nireco decision, in order for 
the means to be considered reasonable, first of all, as a substantive matter 
                                           
9
 SFP Value Realization Master Fund, Ltd. v. Nireco K.K., 1734 Shōji Hōmu 37 (Tōkyō D.Ct., June 
1, 2005). 
10
 SFP Value Realization Master Fund, Ltd. v. Nireco K.K., 1735 Shōji Hōmu 44 (Tōkyō D.Ct., June 
9, 2005).  Although this appellate decision did include some additional arguments, since it agreed with the 
decision and rationale of the original decision, any citations to the Tokyo District Court decision will refer 
to the original decision referenced in SFP Value Realization Master Fund, Ltd. v. Nireco K.K., 1734 Shōji 
Hōmu 37.  
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“the conditions triggering the exercise of the share purchase warrants should 
be limited to circumstances where the hostile bidder’s acquisition of the 
target corporation would cause irreparable harm and not where the bidder 
intends to manage the target corporation in a rational manner.”11  The Nireco 
decision points out that since one of the justifications for the board’s refusal 
to redeem the share purchase warrants was overly broad and unclear, the 
poison pill as a whole failed to provide a standard of judgment adequate to 
prevent arbitrary decisions by the board.  Therefore, the poison pill could not 
be considered reasonable. 
Next, from the standpoint of procedural fairness, the court found that 
in providing leeway to the board to disregard the expert committee’s 
recommendations, the Nireco poison pill effectively allowed the board to 
make arbitrary decisions, and therefore failed to “secure a fair method for 
determining whether the triggering conditions have been met.” 
With respect to reason 3, the court found, in accordance with the 
investment fund’s argument, that the Nireco poison pill caused problems 
relating to the valuation of Nireco shares and that it therefore caused 
unanticipated harm to existing shareholders. 
(3) The Japanese judiciary has compiled a considerable number of 
decisions, spanning several decades, which address the question of 
unfairness in issuing new shares of stock, or in the case of the recent Nippon 
Broadcasting decision, stock purchase warrants to thwart potential 
takeovers.  The sections below seek to unearth the substantive meaning of 
the Nireco decision by examining how it fits into this history of unfair 
issuance jurisprudence and how it might affect shareholder rights plans in 
the future.12 
4. THE MAIN PURPOSE RULE: EXTENDING THE CONVENTIONAL RUBRIC 
(1) Despite the fact that the Nireco decision, in dealing with a so-
called peacetime13 poison pill, addresses an issuance of stock purchase 
warrants adopted for a different purpose than those contested in prior unfair 
                                           
11
 This is considered to be in general agreement with the conditions necessary for an issuance of 
share purchase warrants in the presence of a hostile bidder to be tolerated as an emergency measure as 
delineated by the second appellate court decision in the Nippon Broadcasting case. 
12
 Translator’s Note:  Although the authors frequently refer to the “conventional unfair issuance 
cases,” they do not identify any particular cases except for those included in the footnotes throughout this 
article. 
13
 In this article, the term “emergency” refers to circumstances where a hostile bidder is present, 
while the term “peacetime” refers to circumstances where no hostile bidder is present.  Although the 
dividing line between the two can be very subtle, this article does not address that aspect any more deeply 
since it does not immediately affect the arguments raised herein.  
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issuance cases, rather than adopt an entirely new standard to determine 
whether the issuance was unfair, the court in Nireco opted to apply the main 
purpose rule, the standard conventionally used to determine whether an 
issuance of new shares or stock purchase warrants to a third party in 
response to a present takeover attempt is unfair.14 15  
(2) In order to understand this more completely, it is necessary to 
address how the Nippon Broadcasting decision expanded the scope of the 
main purpose rule, and by doing so, altered the framework for judging 
whether an issuance of new shares or stock purchase warrants is grossly 
unfair.  To put it more specifically, whereas in decisions prior to Nippon 
Broadcasting any issuance of new shares adopted for the main purpose of 
protecting the target management’s corporate control (as opposed to 
legitimate capital raising purposes) would likely be regarded as grossly 
unfair, in the Nippon Broadcasting case, which questioned the legitimacy of 
issuing stock purchase warrants for corporate defense purposes, the court 
acknowledged that even if the main purpose behind the issuance was to 
protect the target management, there could be circumstances where the 
issuance is deemed a legitimate measure enacted to protect the corporation’s 
long-term value.16 17  Under the conventional rubric of the main purpose 
rule, however, corporate defense measures never could be legitimate because 
they necessarily connote a plan to manipulate the composition of 
shareholders, and as such, were nothing more than a tool to entrench the 
target management. 
                                           
14
 There have also been circumstances where the company sets aside new shares for a preferential 
bidder as part of a public appeal for potential friendly investors.  
15
 Translator’s Note:  The authors go into more detail on this point in the paragraphs below. 
16
 The conventional cases dealing with new stock issuances demonstrate that the same result could 
be obtained by ruling that when both capital-raising and management-entrenching purposes are present, the 
capital-raising purposes will be given superiority.  This interpretation was occurring even in circumstances 
where the company’s defensive measures would have been allowed under an exception to the main purpose 
rule, such as the when a greenmailer was present.  At the same time this technique was being criticized as 
encouraging courts to authorize conduct as having a legitimate capital-raising purpose in more instances.  
Since the Nippon Broadcasting case involved stock purchase warrants, which are generally difficult to 
justify as having legitimate capital-raising purposes, the court had no choice but to reorganize the corporate 
defense purpose. 
17
 This rationale already had been tested in Chūjitsuya K.K./Inageya K.K., 1317 Hanrei Jihō 28 
(Tōkyō D.Ct., July 25, 1989).  However, due to a number of logical flaws, among which was an apparent 
contradiction with the principles of the authorized capital system and the freedom of allocation, the 
argument was subsequently rejected in CSK K.K. v. Bell Sys., 24 K.K., 245 Shiryōban Shōji Hōmu 130 
(Tōkyō D.Ct. July 30, 2004), (though it should be noted that since Bell Systems did not involve a hostile 
takeover attempt, it would have been difficult to demonstrate the necessity of invoking an exception to the 
main purpose rule).  Although this article does not address this aspect any further, some might say that the 
argument made in the Nippon Broadcasting case was a revival of the argument raised in Chūjitsuya, just in 
a different form.  
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The Nippon Broadcasting decision noted that the main reason an 
issuance of new stock or stock purchase warrants for management 
entrenchment purposes is unfair is because of the separation of ownership 
and control in a joint stock corporation.18  In other words, shareholders, as 
the owners of a joint stock corporation, hold the power to appoint and 
remove members of the board of directors, while members of the board of 
directors, on the other hand, as the entrusted corporate fiduciaries, are 
expected to execute their managerial duties for the benefit of the 
shareholders as a whole.19  However, this premise also allows for the board 
of directors to enact emergency provisions on behalf of the shareholders 
when there is a clear risk of harm to shareholder value, without infringing 
upon the shareholder’s ownership rights, and thus, it also justifies the court’s 
reading of certain exceptions into the main purpose rule framework, at least 
in situations where the issuance of new stock or stock purchase warrants 
have been made in the face of a hostile bidder.  
(3) In this way, the Nireco decision can be seen as building upon the 
main purpose rule,20 not as interpreted by the conventional unfair issuance 
cases,21 but as reinterpreted by the court in Nippon Broadcasting.  The 
following excerpt from the Nireco decision discusses the appropriate 
methods through which a corporation could enact defensive measures in the 
absence of a clear risk of harm to shareholder value, such as the adoption of 
a poison pill as a preliminary countermeasure to a hostile takeover.  
. . . When there is no present threat to corporate control but one 
is envisioned through a hostile acquisition of shares sometime 
in the future, the actual emergence of which would make 
                                           
18
 Previous cases had always treated unfairness as a natural fact and therefore had never offered a 
rationale. 
19
 However, it is thought to be improper to base this solely on the separation of ownership and 
control.  In the first appellate decision in the Nippon Broadcasting case, the court references some of the 
more substantial conflicts between the board of directors and the shareholders, such as their differing views 
on corporate profits. 
20
 To prevent any possible confusion concerning whether the term “main purpose rule” includes or 
excludes the exceptions, this article will continue to use the term to refer only to the basic provision as 
conventionally used.  In contexts where the exceptions also should be considered, such will be noted. 
21
 In terms of court precedence, the basic principle of the main purpose rule (e.g., comparing the 
relative predominance of various purposes) emerged during the 1960s and 1970s after the chaos of the 
postwar period, and finally became more established during the bubble period.  Around the same time, an 
exception to the main purpose rule was created to deal with such circumstances such as the presence of a 
greenmailer.  Finally after various attempts by Japan’s courts to establish certain exceptions, the Nippon 
Broadcasting decision proposed a main purpose rule with more clearly delineated exceptions.  This version 
of the rule was established with reference to cases addressing the issuance of new shares of stock to a third 
party in order to weaken the influence of a particular majority shareholder or to fend off any potential 
acquirers.  The Tokyo District Court applied this version of the main purpose rule in developing its analysis 
of the peacetime poison pill in the Nireco case. 
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possible the exercise of stock purchase warrants with the main 
purpose of decreasing the hostile bidder’s ownership share, and 
in circumstances where these stock purchase warrants are 
actually issued but ultimately determined not to be in response 
to a hostile bidder whose lack of sincere intent to manage the 
company in a rational manner would cause irreparable harm to 
shareholder value, the need to take preliminary 
countermeasures as a type of emergency response will not be 
recognized.  The same result would occur even in 
circumstances where after determining that the hostile bidder’s 
acquisition of corporate control would not be appropriate from 
the standpoint of preserving long-term corporate value, the 
board of directors will make possible the exercise of stock 
purchase warrants. 
Accordingly, any issuance of new shares or stock 
purchase warrants as a preliminary countermeasure, such as 
presented here, as a general rule, should only be adopted based 
upon the views of the shareholders at the general shareholder 
meeting . . . . 
These additional considerations embraced in the Nireco decision can be 
regarded collectively as the peacetime version of the main purpose rule.22 
(4) Even though the adoption of a peacetime poison pill by a board of 
directors relates to a future occurrence, because it evidences an intention to 
change the shareholder composition the obvious purpose of which is to 
entrench management, it should not be permitted in theory or in principle in 
the same manner that new share issuances to third parties in the face of a 
hostile bidder are not permitted.23 
It could be argued that an issuance of stock purchase warrants, in 
contrast to an issuance of new shares, does not immediately affect the 
shareholder composition, and that therefore, a poison pill utilizing stock 
purchase warrants does not necessarily have an entrenching purpose.  
However, this argument is faulted by the fact that an issuance of stock 
                                           
22
 From a practical business aspect, it should be noted that it has become fairly difficult to 
successfully adopt a poison pill without approval by a resolution at the general shareholder meeting. 
[Translator’s Note:  This would seem to flow directly from the requirement of approval at the general 
shareholder meeting for many other acts, such as the authorization of dividend payments or share 
repurchases].  It is even more difficult to legitimately adopt a poison pill authorizing an allotment to a third 
party through a decision by the board of directors.  To be sure, this does not mean that poison pills that 
have met the necessary conditions will not be allowed; however, that topic is beyond the scope of this 
article.  
23
 This is recognized in the appellate decision as well.  
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purchase warrants foretells a change in the shareholder composition, thereby 
causing a hesitation on the part any potential acquirers.24  This in turn would 
serve to protect the target management, albeit less directly. 
5. REASONABLE DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
(1) In continuation of the above excerpt, the Nireco decision went on 
to state: 
. . . It would be difficult to say that the general shareholder 
meeting is the only potential forum [for enacting corporate 
defense measures in the absence of a clear risk of harm to 
shareholder value].  The possibility that a hostile bidder whose 
acquisition of control could cause irreparable harm to the 
corporation might appear sometime before the next general 
shareholder meeting cannot be ruled out entirely; therefore, it is 
thought that in some circumstances, preliminary 
countermeasures to an attempted takeover adopted by the board 
of directors may be allowed, provided that the means utilized 
are reasonable in relation to the threat posed.  However, even in 
such circumstances, at the very least, a poison pill consisting of 
an issuance of stock purchase warrants must include a system 
for considering views presented at the shareholder meeting.  
Additionally, the poison pill must provide measures to prevent 
arbitrary decisions by the board because of the potential for 
abuse that exists in entrusting the board with the authority to 
determine whether the requisite conditions triggering the 
exercise of the stock purchase warrants have been met. 
The reasons provided by the court for ruling that the preliminary 
countermeasures in this case were not reasonable and imposing the 
injunction against the issuance of stock purchase warrants are described 
above in  3.(2).1, 2, and 3.   
(2) The reasonable means dilemma appears to be a key feature in the 
Nireco decision, in particular when compared to the conventional unfair 
issuance cases.  To be sure, the conventional unfair issuance cases did 
generally state that, if the purpose was legitimate but the means were not 
reasonable in relation to the threat, then it was possible that the issuance 
                                           
24
 This forms the basis for extending the application of the main purpose rule to stock purchase 
warrants.  However, it is not clear from the Nippon Broadcasting case whether this was something of a 
special circumstance because the stock purchase warrants were to be exercised immediately after being 
issued. 
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would be regarded as unfair; however as a practical matter, no previous 
cases had ever recognized a means as being unreasonable.25 
From now on, however, thanks to the pioneering spirit of the Nireco 
court, the key question in future disputes relating to poison pills likely will 
be the reasonableness of the means utilized, as opposed to the main purpose 
under which the poison pill was adopted.26  
(3) Reason 1, supra, poses a problem with the reasonableness of the 
means, but there is an even greater concern that goes to the core of the main 
purpose rule, that is under what conditions the exception to the main purpose 
rule, as stated in Nippon Broadcasting, is justified.  
On the other hand, with respect to reason 3, supra, since it is natural 
for any scheme causing unanticipated harm to existing shareholders to be 
evaluated negatively from a reasonable means standpoint, if the court finds 
that “another means by which the same purposes could have been achieved 
should have been undertaken,”27 this negative view is likely to be the 
deciding factor in the court’s decision.28  
With respect to the potential for arbitrary decision-making by the 
board noted in reason 2, there are both substantive (justifications for refusing 
to redeem the poison pill) and procedural (special committee’s authority vis-
à-vis the board of directors) problems that would need to be addressed.  
Several important substantive problems from reason 2 should be examined 
further. 
(4) The Nireco decision approved of four of the five circumstances 
that would allow the board of directors to justifiably refuse to redeem the 
poison pill (1.(2).5.i-iv), but rejected the last circumstance (1.(2).5.v), which 
would have allowed the board of directors to refuse to redeem the poison pill 
in “other situations, such as where there is an obvious threat of harm to the 
corporate value of the Nireco group, including but not limited to existing 
Nireco shareholders, business affiliates, customers, employees, regional 
companies, or other stakeholders.” 
The first four justifications for board refusal were found to be 
legitimate, insofar as they were based on the court’s decision in the Nippon 
                                           
25
 The Nippon Broadcasting decision also expressed this viewpoint, but it never inquired into the 
reasonableness of the means because it found that the purpose itself was unjust on its face.  On the other 
hand, where there does seem to be some examination into the reasonableness of the means in previous 
cases, they all find that if the purpose was just then the means were also reasonable (or at least were within 
the limits of business judgment). 
26
 Translator’s Note:  This next section discusses more specifically how the provisions of the Nireco 
poison pill violated the reasonable means requirement. 
27
 This is mentioned in the first appellate decision. 
28
 Whether or not the Nireco poison pill actually caused existing shareholders unforeseen harm 
necessarily involves an economic analysis and as such will not be addressed any further in this article. 
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Broadcasting case; but, it should be noted that their applicability in the face 
of a hostile bidder has never been tested.  It is unknown whether they would 
be applied in a real dispute as hypothesized in the Nippon Broadcasting 
decision.  Yet, as a practical matter, since no other appropriate clues as to 
their origin have been found, the circumstances likely are attributable to the 
Nippon Broadcasting decision. 
The last circumstance, which was not accepted by the Nireco court as 
a legitimate justification for the board of director’s refusal to redeem the 
poison pill, must be examined in two parts.  First, is it appropriate for the 
board of directors to take into consideration potential harm to parties who 
are not shareholders, but otherwise have a substantial relationship with the 
corporation?  While the notion of stakeholder interests had been raised in the 
Nippon Broadcasting decision, ultimately, there was never any clear 
resolution.29  Next, do circumstances obviously evidencing potential harm to 
long-term corporate value justify the enactment of corporate defense 
measures within the exception to the main purpose rule?  While the first 
appellate decision in the Nippon Broadcasting case seemed to answer in the 
affirmative, the final appellate decision did not.30  Furthermore, it is 
completely unclear what meaning the phrase “other such circumstances” 
holds or how much importance should be attributed to it.  The Nireco 
decision is by no means clear with respect to where it stands on these issues, 
but nevertheless, it rejects this final justification for the board’s refusal to 
redeem the stock purchase warrants as “overly broad and indefinite.”31  
6. HARM TO EXISTING SHAREHOLDERS 
(1) In the conventional unfair issuance cases, the shareholder harm 
caused by an issuance of new shares or stock purchase warrants to a third 
party included the loss of corporate control, the loss of the possibility to gain 
corporate control, and in some circumstances, the loss of certain rights 
guaranteed to minority shareholders.  Though these points may not have 
                                           
29
 METI’s Corporate Value Study Group also raised this issue in its Final Report, but nothing 
conclusive was stated.  
30
 In the final appellate decision, the argument that harm to corporate value constitutes a corporate 
defense measure was rejected.  If viewed from the notion that “difficult judgments concerning corporate 
value should be put to a shareholder vote,” which formed the basis of the court’s view, it would seem likely 
that a claim for non-obvious harm would be rejected.  However, the same probably could not be said for 
harm that is obvious, or in other words, circumstances which a reasonable person (including judges in this 
context), as opposed to the business elite, would unmistakably determine to be harmful.     
31
 Although the Nippon Broadcasting decisions express a slightly different view regarding the 
circumstances in which corporate defense purposes may be justified, they still may have influenced the 
Nireco decisions in this respect. 
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garnered specific recognition in every case, they are self evident in those 
cases dealing with battles over managerial control.  And, as the degree of 
harm suffered by shareholders started to gain more consideration through the 
court’s application of the main purpose rule, whether or not there had been a 
change causing minority shareholders to lose their rights came to be 
regarded as one possible dividing line between issuances that were fair and 
those that were not.32  As a result, an increase or decrease in a shareholder’s 
ownership percentage or the degree of such change came to be regarded as 
factors which may influence the success (or failure) of a petition for an 
injunction against the underlying issuance. 
(2) In contrast, the Nireco case presents a type of shareholder harm of 
a different nature than those presented above.  The problem, as viewed by 
the court in Nireco, had become one of purely economic harm represented 
by a tangible decrease in the value of the company’s individual shares.  Even 
though this notion of simple economic harm stands in stark contrast to the 
conventional unfair issuance cases, the court seems to have regarded it as 
axiomatic, as there is no trace of any arguments challenging or even 
questioning whether this type of harm is something which shareholders 
should be protected against under the unfair issuance framework.33  
If the harm suffered by shareholders is purely economic in nature, 
then a shareholder’s ownership percentage is no longer a substantial issue in 
unfair issuance cases.  In fact, the Nireco decision made it possible for an 
injunction sought by a shareholder owning less than three percent of the 
corporation’s outstanding shares to be granted.34  To extend this even further, 
under this new interpretation of what constitutes shareholder harm, a 
shareholder owning no more than one share would be able to demand an 
injunction against the issuance of new shares or stock purchase warrants on 
the basis that it negatively affected the economic value of that one share. 
                                           
32
 For other examples of cases that have pointed out just how few shares were held by the 
shareholder requesting the injunction, see Daisō, 1204 Kinyū Hanrei 6 (Osaka D.Ct., Sept. 27, 2004); 
Ichiya, 251 Shiryōban Shōji Hōmu 220 (Kōchi D.Ct. July 8, 2004); and Nippon Broad., 1496 Hanrei Jihō 
123 (Tokyo D.Ct. March 28, 1994).  
33
 Factors relating to both the substantive judgments of the courts and the necessary qualifications of 
the claimant (standing) have their settled place within discussions concerning the conventional unfair 
issuance cases.  These discussions have also demonstrated the court-centric point of view that “with respect 
to injunction requests alleging that an issuance is grossly unfair, it is thought that only those shareholders 
who are presently battling for corporate control or who will lose minority shareholder rights [as a result of 
the issue] are considered to have standing.” Ōyori Hisashi, et al., Lawsuit Seeking Injunction of Issuance of 
Share Purchase Warrants, 1172 HANREI TIMES 60, 61 (April 2005). 
34
 From what can be gleaned from various news reports, the investment fund held six percent of 
Nireco’s outstanding shares.  Regardless, there would be no effect on the ultimate outcome if that number 
was two or six percent. 
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(3) The Nireco poison pill was deemed to have caused this type of 
unexpected harm to its existing shareholders because of the aforementioned 
characteristics of the Nireco poison pill.  However, the effect of this 
consideration of share value is not limited to such circumstances.  Because a 
decline in shareholder value is a problem that commonly occurs when 
excessively protective corporate measures have been adopted, any 
shareholder (even an owner of just one share) would be able to request an 
injunction against a peacetime poison pill for provisions viewed as 
excessively protective. 
Since whether or not a protective measure is excessive will depend 
upon its relative reasonableness (as addressed in 5.(3), supra), it is possible 
that an injunction claim asserting that the enacted measures are excessive 
may be based upon mere comparison of two different measures.35 
7. THE GENERAL SHAREHOLDER MEETING 
(1) As demonstrated in 4.(3), supra, the District Court in Nireco 
opined that, as a general rule, poison pills are to be enacted only upon 
approval at the general shareholders meeting or, at least, are to reflect the 
intention of the general shareholders meeting.  
Conversely, does this mean that the problems associated with a poison 
pill may be disregarded simply because the poison pill was adopted by a 
resolution at the general shareholder meeting?  The answer still is not clear, 
since the Nireco decision limited its discussion of “reasonable preliminary 
countermeasures” to poison pills adopted by the board of directors, as 
opposed to the general shareholders.36  The conventional unfair issuance 
cases do not seem to indicate that approval at the general shareholder 
meeting immediately absolves the otherwise unfair issuance of its 
problematic features.37 
(2) The notion that an issuance of new shares or stock purchase 
warrants, even if approved by a resolution at the general shareholder 
                                           
35
 If this is the case, then it is likely that as soon as a poison pill is enacted, it will require proper 
revisions. 
36
 The Corporate Value Study Group’s Final Report does not mention this either. 
37
 Since, at that time, Nippon Broad., 1496 Hanrei Jihō 123 (Tokyo D.Ct. March 28, 1994) restricted 
the transfer of its shares, any allotment to a third party must have been approved by a special resolution at 
the general shareholder meeting.  However, courts were willing to examine the fairness of any such 
issuance, even in circumstances where eighty-five percent or more of those holding voting rights had 
approved the issuance.  In the first appellate review of Ichiya, 251 Shiryōban Shōji Hōmu 220 (Kōchi D.Ct. 
July 8, 2004), the court subjected an issuance of stock purchase warrants to a third party that had been 
approved by special resolution to a similar of review.  Since in both cases the courts ultimately dismissed 
the request for an injunction, the relationship between the court’s decision to review the issuance and its 
conclusion is rather unclear.  
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meeting, still may be regarded as grossly unfair for other reasons does not 
make sense from the standpoint of the “separation of corporate ownership 
and control.”  Under the separation of ownership and control theory,  if those 
who have the authority to appoint and remove members of the board—e.g., 
the majority shareholders—approve the measure, then there should be no 
further inquiry into the measure’s intended purpose, whether it be to protect 
the target management or otherwise.  Thus, if we believe that the 
conventional unfair issuance cases have left open the possibility that an 
issuance be deemed unfair despite approval at the general shareholder 
meeting, then there must be some other considerations at play, for example 
the notion that the board of directors operates to protect the minority 
shareholders from the majority shareholders, or even broader, to protect the 
shareholders in general, or possibly shareholders at the individual level.38 
(3) This point becomes even more important if we consider that a 
simple decrease in the economic value of a share (addressed in 6.(3), supra) 
is deemed to constitute damage, because then the holder of even just one 
share would be able to request an injunction against the corporation.  Could 
such a problem be resolved upon a resolution at the general shareholder 
meeting,39 and if so, what must that resolution consist of? 
The procedures for issuing new shares or stock purchase warrants 
favorable to particular parties (Commercial Code, Art. 280-2 paragraph 2, 
Special Resolutions) may shed some light on how to deal with possible 
decreases in the economic value of shares.  Under these procedures, 
information related to potential decreases in economic value must be 
disclosed in an understandable manner.  In addition, the procedures for 
changing provisions in the articles of association to restrict the transfer of 
shares (Commercial Code, Art. 348, Special Resolutions), which were 
touched on by the Court in Nireco, guarantee a buyout to any shareholder 
who opposes such change.  (Commercial Code, Art. 349).  Even if we 
acknowledge that a poison pill must be approved by a resolution at the 
general shareholder meeting, there are still other important factors that have 
yet to be clarified, such as the actual form of any such decision and whether 
and to what extent minority rights and interests shall be secured.40 41  
                                           
38
 The need to protect minority shareholder rights is becoming less apparent in part due to recent 
revisions in the Commercial Code, including the reduction of the percentage of outstanding shares required 
in order for a shareholder to exercise a right to inspect the company’s books from ten to three percent. 
39
 Should it really be possible for a poison pill, even one that poses serious consequences for share 
value such as the Nireco poison pill, to be absolved of its problems simply because it has been approved by 
shareholders? 
40
 From the perspective of the separation of ownership and control, the resolution of the general 
shareholder meeting to adopt a poison pill should be an ordinary resolution, the same as would be required 
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While it is acceptable to view the resolution of the general shareholder 
meeting as a necessary condition to successfully adopt a poison pill, it is 
important to realize that there are lingering doubts as to whether that alone 
will ultimately be regarded as sufficient.42  
8. EPILOGUE 
It would be completely natural to regard the Nireco poison pill as a 
failure if one were to focus upon the final result in the courtroom.  However, 
when viewed within the larger transition occurring within Japanese 
corporate governance, the Nireco poison pill also could be interpreted as a 
bold maneuver by a Japanese firm prompted by sheer necessity.  And at 
some point in the future, it will probably be regarded as fulfilling a 
necessary role in the development of corporate defense measures for the 
practical lessons gleaned from the ensuing litigation.   
What is essential now is that all of the parties with a stake in the 
matter, including law practitioners and scholars, determine how these 
practical lessons can be applied in order to support the future development 
of healthy corporations and a strong economic structure. 
 
(June 12, 2005) 
 
<Supplementary Note> 
On June 15, 2005 the Tokyo High Court dismissed Nireco’s final 
appeal (See the SFP Value Realization Master Fund, Ltd. v. Nireco K.K., 
1735 Shōji Hōmu 48 (Tōkyō D.Ct., June 15, 2005)).  While the decision did 
                                                                                                                              
for the election of board members.  (Under current law, removing a member of the board requires a special 
resolution, but under a proposed corporate law bill, agreement by a principle majority would suffice.) 
Now what would happen when a proposal requiring a special resolution is agreed to by a majority of 
the voters, but does not receive the particular number of votes necessary for a special resolution?  Can the 
board of directors establish requirements for the passage of shareholder proposals that are not based upon 
law or interpretations of law?  Can the board of directors disregard the wishes of a majority of the 
shareholders?  Since the board’s consideration of shareholder proposals is discretionary in the first place, 
would the board’s decision to ignore a majority also be within that scope of discretion?  Would this change 
if the shareholder’s intentions have clearly become known to the board?   
41
 Insofar as the “trust model” is structured upon granting stock purchase warrants to a third party 
either gratuitously or for a minimal price, it would seem as though the procedures for favorable issuances to 
particular parties would be the appropriate method for its enactment.  However, since the stock purchase 
warrants are scheduled to vest with shareholders of record as of a certain date, they are considered to be 
granted based upon current shareholder status.  From a practical standpoint, these stock purchase warrants 
cannot be regarded as having been issued under emergency conditions, and therefore, there is no basis for 
requiring a special resolution. 
42
 Translator’s Note:  This is the view of the District Court in Nireco.  The view of the High Court in 
Nireco is somewhat vague, but may be different.  The authors are silent on this point. 
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not make particular mention of issues relating to general shareholder 
approval or prevention against arbitrary judgments by the board of directors, 
it did attach importance to the fact that the poison pill at issue potentially 
caused excessive property harm to shareholders other than the hostile 
bidder.43 
                                           
43
 Translator’s Note:  According to the authors, with respect to the reasoning offered by the District 
Court, the High Court emphasized the share valuation problems and appeared rather critical toward the rest, 
which is an important indicator of which direction future case law may take. 
